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Abstract
As they arrive in our homes, nursing facilities and educational institutions, urgent 
questions are being asked about the ethics of encouraging people to have feelings 
towards social robots that have roles as companions, carers and teachers. This article 
suggests that the quality of these debates is enhanced by examining how people perceive 
robots and, in particular, how robots’ expressive characteristics stimulate feelings through 
engaging the embodied imagination. I discuss the perception and expression of the 
zoomorphic therapeutic robot Paro, before considering the directions an understanding of 
these processes can take discussions about the aesthetics and ethics of social robots.
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The robotic baby harp seal Paro gazes up with large dark eyes set amid soft, thick, white fur, 
raising its head in response to its name. It bats long eyelashes and waggles its tail, cooing when 
caressed and squawking if held too tightly. When a dummy-shaped charger is introduced into 
its mouth, it coyly turns its head away. The robot cries for attention and settles down at night-
time. Its actuators are designed to be especially quiet and its mechanisms are well hidden by 
an abundant coat. Its appeal lies somewhere between a pet animal and a large plush teddy bear.
Paro is a widely distributed and researched example of a zoomorphic social robot designed 
to stimulate feelings of wellbeing in its interlocutor.1 It was made available in 2005 as a 
therapeutic companion for the elderly in Japan and is now used across thirty countries, 
including Australia where a randomised controlled trial is currently underway.2 Before the late 
twentieth century robots were figments of the imagination. Today they are tangible, although 
still thoroughly entwined with our imagination. When Paro is placed alongside people or 
on their lap, they stroke, mimic, talk to and cuddle the robot in response to its gestures 
and sounds. They also engage with it socially in interaction with carers and other patients. 
Although it is sometimes rejected or discarded, most reactions to the robot are positive and 
some people enthusiastically embrace the device. Among other affordances, Paro might replace 
the comfort of a pet or function as a positive communal occupation to pass the time. Research 
indicates that the robotic seal increases positive affect in the elderly, encourages people with 
dementia to speak and socialise, and is especially effective when deployed as part of a social 
experience.3 In Denmark, where Paro is widely used, a one-day training program for caregivers 
working with Paro recommends Paro be used as a stimulating activity in an individual or 
group setting, or as a specifically targeted therapy to arouse, settle down or stimulate memory 
and language.4 Across the countries in which Paro is distributed, caregivers generally structure 
sessions with the robot according to the needs of the participants. Pets are frequently invoked 
when the device is first introduced to people.
As social robots arrive in our homes, nursing facilities and educational institutions, urgent 
questions are being asked about the ethics of encouraging people to have feelings towards 
these devices that have roles as companions, carers and teachers. This article suggests that the 
quality of these debates is enhanced by examining how people perceive robots, in particular 
how robots’ expressive characteristics stimulate feelings through engaging the embodied 
imagination.
Paro’s most striking expressive features are its eyes, fur, gestures and sounds, which are 
experienced visually, aurally, tactilely and proprioceptively. Its large and animated orbs almost 
solely carry the effect of a facial expression, with its remaining face amorphous and still. 
1 For the purposes of this discussion social robots are autonomous or semi-autonomous devices that 
may perform tasks completely autonomously, with partial control and human supervision, or with direct 
control. They have social roles and are designed to interact and communicate with humans and follow 
social behaviours associated with their roles.
2 Wendy Moyle et al., ‘Effect of an Interactive Therapeutic Robotic Animal on Engagement, Mood States, 
Agitation and Psychotropic Drug Use in People with Dementia: A Cluster-randomised Controlled Trial 
Protocol’, BMJ Open, no. 5, 2015. 
3 Kazuyoshi Wada and Takanori Shibata, ‘Living with Seal Robots: Its Sociopsychological and Physiolo-
gical Influences on the Elderly at a Care House’, Robotics, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 23, no. 5, 2007, pp. 
972–80; Wendy Moyle et al., ‘Exploring the Effect of Companion Robots on Emotional Expression in Older 
Adults with Dementia’, Journal of Gerontological Nursing, vol. 39, no. 5, 2013, pp. 46–53; and Selma Šaban-
ović et al., ‘Paro Robot Affects Diverse Interaction Modalities in Group Sensory Therapy for Older Adults 
with Dementia’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Rehabilitation Robotics 2013, Seattle, WA, 
2013; Cory D. Kidd et al., ‘A Sociable Robot to Encourage Social Interaction among the Elderly’, in Proceed-
ings of the IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation IEEE, Florida, 2006.
4 Barbara Klein et al., ‘Emotional Robots: Principles and Experiences with Paro in Denmark, Germany, 
and the UK’, GeroPsych, vol. 26, no. 2, 2013, 89–99.
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The size of the eyes is exaggerated, as are the long eyelashes by which they are framed. 
Expressive features of robots and animated figures often call heavily on the eyes (for examples, 
see the robots Kismet, Buddy and Domo, and animated figures like Rango and the Despicable 
Me minions). Paro does not see through its eyes; nonetheless, those interacting with it 
attribute meaning to them. Eye contact symbolises and generates a sense of connection, and 
direction of gaze indicates attention and intention.
Paro’s eyes (and those of many animated figures) also establish the device’s cuteness, 
evoking associations with human and animal infants, as well as associated ideas and 
feelings concerning powerlessness, care and tenderness. The exaggerated eyes are set amid 
the robot’s blobby shape and fluffiness in a manner characteristic of cute objects, as noted 
by Sianne Ngai, who writes that a typical cute object has a ‘simplistically simplified and 
even unformed’ face.5 The affective effects of cuteness are not achieved by realism, but by 
exaggerated expressive features—simplification and formlessness—that are readily seen in 
Paro.
Paro’s expressive movements, registered by its interlocutor visually and sometimes 
tactilely, are limited to batting its eyes, sliding its flippers back and forth, raising and 
lowering its head, moving its head from side to side and tail wagging. These simple 
gestures have a powerful effect, their presence and timing express pleasure, displeasure, 
desire and recognition. The robot raises its head and bats its eyelids in response to hearing 
a voice, movements of recognition and need that call for an affective response. The robot’s 
stillness conveys satisfaction and rapid motion conveys happiness and excitement. The 
significance of gestures is intensified and anchored by the sounds of the robotic seal, its 
crying and cooing is modelled on those of a baby harp seal and reminiscent of a variety of 
young animals, setting in motion associations with satisfaction, pain or need. Following 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the perception of such expressions can be perceived as driven by 
an embodied imagination that entangles affects with perceptual processes, allowing for 
the direct perception of feelings.6 This imagination is not associated with inner images, 
fantasies or make-believe; rather, it is present in and shapes all processes of perception, 
such as those that underlie human–robot interaction. It infuses and moves the body, 
incorporating social imaginaries so that interaction with robots circulates social and 
cultural norms and values enmeshed with affects.
Most strikingly, Paro is covered with a thick, pale fur coat, each one individually hand-
trimmed to give the robot a unique quality and an appealing fluffiness that is a familiar 
attribute of cute objects. Cute as an aesthetic ‘depends on a softness that invites physical 
touching’, writes Ngai.7 The coat is luxurious, soliciting people to engage with the robot 
through touch and proprioception, evoking stuffed children’s toys, long-haired ‘ornamental’ 
pets and furred clothes. A number of studies record how subjects gently stroke or touch 
Paro when initiating and continuing positive interaction with the device.8 This tactility 
lies at the heart of research into Paro that views it as a kind of ‘snoezelen’ or multi-sensory 
5 Sianne Ngai, ‘The Cuteness of the Avant-Garde’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 31, no. 4, 2005, p. 816.
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1962, pp. 235–82.
7 Ngai, p. 815.
8 Ruby Yu et al., ‘Use of a Therapeutic, Socially Assistive Pet Robot (PARO) in Improving Mood and Stim-
ulating Social Interaction and Communication for People With Dementia: Study Protocol for a Randomized 
Controlled Trial’, JMIR Research Protocols, vol. 4, no. 2, 2015; Wendy Moyle et al., ‘Social Robots Helping 
People with Dementia: Assessing Efficacy of Social Robots in the Nursing Home Environment’, in The 6th 
International Conference on Human System Interaction (HSI), Gdansk, 2013, pp. 608–13; and Klein et al.
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therapy.9 Ideas, words, values, mechanisms, calculations and sensations informing the tactile 
imagination circulate emotions and affects. Touch has compelling literal and metaphorical 
associations, sliding between an immediate physical act and more metaphorical meanings, 
signifying contact between entities and intimacy. As Mark Paterson observes, touch ‘is a 
sense of communication. It is receptive, expressive, can communicate empathy. It can bring 
distant objects and people into proximity.’10 More often than not, one touches things and 
people that one is comfortable with. The literal and metaphoric dynamics of tactility channel 
pre-subjective affects, such as the warmth felt when hands sink into soft fur, as well as 
subject-oriented emotions such as ‘I am happy it likes me touching it’ and ‘I care for this 
vulnerable entity’. Writing of when different species touch—and Paro is related to a furry 
animal species—Donna Haraway posits that ‘touch ramifies and shapes accountability’; it ‘has 
consequences’ so that a person is entangled with that which she touches.11
The act of touching the fur takes the form of a caress, which elicits compelling associations 
in its performance of the giving of care and pleasure. As examined in Emmanuel Levinas’s 
work (although not in terms of animals or robots) and later interrogated by Luce Irigaray, 
the caress has a profound existential aspect as an expression of love, as a gesture that is not 
intended to conclude with an object but seeks a response from an Other.12 Empirically, 
engaging proprioception has been observed to increase emotional engagement, something 
that is regularly exploited in the development of video games.13 In eliciting the caress, Paro 
is eliciting feelings of comfort, care and tenderness. Research subjects interacting with Paro 
engage in nurturing behaviours such as feeding and covering the device with a blanket.14 
When caressing Paro, people regulate their own gestures to elicit desired responses so that, to 
use Morana Alač’s phrase, ‘the robot’s body reconfigures human movement’.15
As Merleau-Ponty notes, the perception of bodies is reversible. The lived body is perceived 
by the bodies it perceives, and Paro is a machinic example of this. Although attuned to human 
expression, Paro’s perception differs from human perception. A network of touch, light, sound, 
temperature and posture sensors measure data that is processed via artificial intelligence (AI) 
software.16 Its whiskers are touch sensitive and a skin of sensors lies below its fur, which detects 
force, magnitude and location. These sensors are an important determinant of the robot’s behaviour. 
The sensors on its back, belly and flippers are used to establish whether it is being stroked or 
hit, whether it is touching the human body or being held too tight. A sound sensor detects the 
direction of voices and a light sensor hidden in Paro’s nose determines whether it is day or night.
9 Selma Šabanović et al.; Wan-Ling Chang et al., ‘Use of Seal-Like Robot PARO in Sensory Group Therapy 
for Older Adults with Dementia’, Proceedings of Human Robot Interaction Conference 2013, Late-Breaking 
Reports, Tokyo Japan, 2013; and Marceel Heerink et al., ‘A Kind of Snoezelen: Requirements for a Thera-
peutic Robot for Older Adults with Dementia According to Caregivers’, RO-MAN, 2013 IEEE, Gyeongju, 2013.
10 Mark Paterson, The Senses of Touch: Haptics, Affects and Technologies, Berg, Oxford and New York, 
2007, p. 1.
11 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2007,
p. 36.
12 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingus, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, 
1969, pp. 257–60. Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. 
Gill,  Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1993, pp. 154–79.
13 Eugénie Shinkle, ‘Video Games, Emotion and the Six Senses’, Media, Culture & Society, vol. 30, 
no. 6, 2008, pp. 907–15.
14 Klein et al., p. 95.
15 Alač, p. 508.
16 Brenna D. Argall and Aude G. Billard, ‘A Survey of Tactile Human–Robot Interactions’, Robotics and 
Autonomous Systems, vol. 58, no. 10, 2010, p. 1159–76.
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Information from Paro’s sensors, particularly the touch and sound sensors, is processed 
by algorithmic AI software, which drives the selection and execution of a finite number of 
behaviours.17 There are pet and therapy versions of its software; either can be loaded depending 
on the intended application, varying its responsiveness and ability to store information so that it 
can tailor behaviour to particular users. The software uses a Reinforcement Learning Framework 
to select its response, so its behaviour is potentially adaptive and its classification of human 
touch as positive or negative is used for its behaviour selection. Versions with voice recognition 
software are able to learn a few words and respond to keywords, such as its name and greetings.
The physical sensors and algorithmic processing software of Paro—machinic and 
computational elements—are distinctive features of its expression and perception. The 
quantification of human feeling and expression that occurs in human–robot interaction is a 
conspicuous difference between how Paro perceives and how the human lived body perceives. 
The robot’s perception measures people’s gestures, a measurement that is presented back to 
them in the robot’s expression. This quantification suggests that Paro is an example of what Don 
Ihde terms a hermeneutic technic, although it is more common to view robots as an example 
of alterity relations (wherein technology is experienced as having a kind of quasi-otherness).18 
Giving a paradigm example of a thermometer, Idhe writes: ‘A hermeneutic relation mimics 
sensory perception insofar as it is a kind of seeing as ____ [sic]; but it is a referential seeing, which 
has as its immediate perceptual focus seeing the thermometer.’19 The technological artefact is 
‘read’ and perceived as representing the world, as occurs when a person reads the temperature 
on the thermometer rather than perceiving the temperature itself. Comparably, Paro measures 
touch and speech and translates it into non-isomorphic data, which is then presented back to the 
interlocutor as sound and gesture to be ‘read’ as indicators of feelings of care or anger. Socially 
constituted norms are employed in how the robot treats information (for instance, norms of what 
constitutes painful or pleasurable touch, or affectionate or angry voices), and how it is expressed 
by the robot (for instance, norms of what constitutes a cry of pain or wriggle of pleasure). The 
process thus quantifies feeling, participating in the practice of presenting emotions numerically 
that Otniele Dror traces from the late nineteenth century to contemporary affective computing.20 
This process of measurement incorporates a social imaginary and its customs and standards.
Like its expression, the physical structures and algorithmic processing that are Paro’s 
perception call upon an embodied imagination borrowed from its creators and interlocutors. 
Its tactile sensors do not just register electrical charge in the human body, they are designed 
to register certain charges as pain and affection. Its sound sensors and associated software 
do not just measure volume and recognise a few words, they assess tenderness and attention. 
For many people, Paro is a generator and circulator of positive feeling via sensations of 
touch, hearing, sight and proprioception and their associated imaginings, as indicated by the 
frequency of smiling and laughter during people’s interactions with the device.21 Thought of 
17 Ibid.
18 Don Ihde, Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1990, pp. 80–97, 97–108. See also Mark Coeckelbergh, ‘Humans, Animals, and Robots: A Phenomenological 
Approach to Human-Robot Relations’, International Journal of Social Robotics, vol. 3, no. 2, 2011, p. 198.
19 Ihde, p. 85.
20 Otniel E. Dror, ‘Counting the Affects: Discoursing in Numbers’, Social Research, vol. 68, no. 2, 2001, 
pp. 357–78.
21 Yu et al.; Moyle et al., ‘Social Robots Helping People’, pp. 1–2; Kazue Takayanagi, Takahiro Kirita and 
Takanori Shibata, ‘Comparison of Verbal and Emotional Responses of Elderly People with Mild/Moderate 
Dementia and Those with Severe Dementia in Responses to Seal Robot, PARO’, Frontiers in Aging Neuro-
science, vol. 6, 2014.
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as an intersubjective lived body in connection and continuity with others, Paro’s perception 
is not reducible to straightforward sensor data and its processing, but is mediated by the 
cultural and social imaginary—for instance, through language (verbal and bodily), values 
(what is positive and negative attention) and narrative (when I care for a vulnerable being it 
will care for me back).
Focusing on how social robots are perceived emphasises the continuity between social 
robots and other expressive practices and technologies, such as artworks, film and video 
games. These connections help move thinking about social robots away from the tendency of 
technoscience to understand ‘its own project as the articulation of the real’, and on towards 
questions about the aesthetics and ethics of the imagination and its engagement with robots.22 
In this approach, the evaluation of people’s feelings towards social robots should not be made 
in terms of whether those feelings are true and authentic or false and manipulated, but with 
regards to how such feelings circulate within the broader structures and behaviours in people’s 
lives. Below I examine more closely the way the perception and expression of the zoomorphic 
therapeutic robot Paro involves embodied imagination and affect. I then examine processes 
of direct and reversible perception, before considering the directions these concerns take 
discussions about the aesthetic and ethics of social robots.
Direct perception, embodied imagination and the circulation 
of feeling
Examining processes of the embodied social imagination present in perception aids an 
understanding of how the perceptual and expressive processes of Paro circulate affect. 
Merleau-Ponty has shown there is a fundamental creativity of perception integral to lived 
bodies and artworks that arises from the way the embodied imagination organises perception.23 
There is no sensation independent of perception, which, resonant with temporality, 
incorporates a web of relationships between sensations, ideas, memories and feelings (as far as 
these things can be distinguished). Unlike those understandings of perception that distinguish 
it from pre-personal sensation, this embodied perception is pre-personal.24 The synaesthetic 
aspects of this approach are often discussed, for it understands each sensory mode to be set 
among the other senses so that experiences—and media—seemingly in one sensory mode 
are permeated with the other senses.25 Also important is the way the imaginative processes 
inherent in perception are experienced directly via the expressive features of things, something 
very apparent in the perception of artworks.
Kathleen Lennon describes this process as one of ‘direct perception’, in which the 
grasp of the expressive content of art occurs without inference to an underlying subjective 
state but directly with the perception of expressive content.26 For example, when a colour 
22 Jackie Stacey and Lucy Suchman, ‘Animation and Automation: The Liveliness and Labours of Bodies 
and Machines’, Body & Society, vol. 18, no. 1, 2012, p. 23.
23 Merleau-Ponty himself did not fully formulate a theory of the imagination but it is implicit in his 
account of the way the lived body organises perception. See Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
pp. 235–82 and Kathleen Lennon, ‘Imaginary Bodies and Worlds’, Inquiry, vol. 47, no. 2, 2004, pp. 115–7.
24 For example Brian Massumi’s widely adopted understanding of affect sees pre-personal affect and 
sensation as contrasted with perception. See Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation, Duke University Press, Durham, 2002, pp. 27–8. 
25 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 266–7.
26 Kathleen Lennon, ‘Imagination and the Expression of Emotion’, pp. 292–8. See also Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 175.
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evokes a feeling, that feeling is experienced directly with the perception of the colour. 
Or a person’s perception of Paro’s soft body occasions a feeling of care. And, extending the 
notion of direct perception to tactile, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic senses, when a person 
perceives herself caressing Paro tenderness is experienced. The link between movement and 
affect is firmly secured by Merleau-Ponty, who explains that bodily gesture is constitutive 
of feeling (as well as thought) because ‘the expressed does not exist apart from the 
expression’.27 Consequently, the ‘gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself ’.28 
By this understanding, expressing a feeling instantiates the feeling. Perception enfolds the 
world into a body, occasioning feeling of how the lived body is affected by that perception. 
Affect here is a sense of perception’s valence for that body. Not only is there no sensation 
independent of embodied perceptual processes, but perception is inextricably bound up 
with affective experience.
Direct perception helps explain how it is that people have feelings towards Paro regardless 
of the beliefs they hold about the ‘real’ nature of the robot. I may know that Paro is simply 
a machine that does not care for me, but nonetheless experience emotional warmth when 
interacting with the device. Sherry Turkle and others describe how people—even roboticists—
develop strong caring feelings towards robots despite their belief that robots are not living 
beings.29 In this way social robots are similar to artworks, which also engage the imagination 
to provoke people’s feelings regardless of the beliefs people hold about them. People’s 
response to artworks such as films, paintings, novels and theatre often occur whether a story 
is true, a character is real or, indeed, whether anything or anyone depicted is recognisable.30 
This similarity between artworks and social robots is increasingly apparent in the ongoing 
convergence between social roboticists, animators, animatronics and puppetry.31 Among other 
things, these practices create and vitalise faces and bodies to display character and to elicit and 
express emotion. They share the need to avoid the notorious ‘uncanny valley’ and the goal of 
animating the inert.32 Less often commented on is the way both social robots and artworks 
evoke affect through non-representational perceptions via the embodied imagination.33
Significantly, in this process the embodied imagination calls upon a social imaginary 
for, as Lennon points out, its forms and values arise from social processes.34 Historically 
and culturally specific social imaginaries are shared across collectives and entrenched in 
27 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 169.
28 Ibid., p. 214.
29 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, Basic 
Books, New York, 2011, pp. 23–147. See also Matthias Scheutz, ‘The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional 
Emotional Bonds between Humans and Social Robots’, in Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications 
of Robotics, ed. Patrick Lin, Keith Abney and George A. Bekey, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011, pp. 211–4.
30 In philosophy this is termed the problem of ‘fictional emotions’. See for example, Richard Moran, ‘The 
Expression of Feeling in Imagination’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 103, no. 1, 2004, pp. 75–106.
31 Cynthia Breazeal et al., ‘Interactive Robot Theatre’, Communications of the ACM, vol. 46, no. 7, 2003, 
pp. 76–85; Jesse Gray et al., ‘Expressive, Interactive Robots: Tools, Techniques, and Insights Based on 
Collaborations’, HRI 2010 Workshop: What do Collaborations with the Arts have to say about HRI, Osaka, 
2010; Derek Scherer, ‘Movie Magic Makes Better Social Robots: The Overlap of Special Effects and Charac-
ter Robot Engineering’, Journal of Human–Robot Interaction, vol. 3, no. 1, 2014, pp. 123–41; and Scheutz, 
pp. 211–4.
32 The uncanny valley is a widely discussed hypothesis proposed by Masahiro Mori. It proposes that 
most people experience a sense of revulsion when they perceive features that look and move almost like 
humans, but that are not exactly alike and lack key human features. 
33 For further discussion of this relationship see Vivian Sobchack, ‘Animation and Automation, or the 
Incredible Effortness of Being’, Screen, vol. 50, no. 4, 2009, pp. 375–91 and Stacey and Suchman, pp. 1–46.
34 Lennon, ‘Imaginary Bodies and Worlds’, pp. 107–22.
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institutions, devices and cultural practices, in this case robotics.35 Social imaginaries overlap 
and inform individual bodies’ imaginative processes and the affects entwined with them. 
The way direct perception draws on an embodied and social imagination sits comfortably 
alongside the considerable research that demonstrates how sensations are always part of a 
particular sensorium, organised into hierarchies and relationships in historically specific bodily 
practices.36 As Vivian Sobchack points out in her discussion of the lived body of cinema, 
sensation is always mediated and calls upon particular sets of sensory practices and values.37 
Cinema and other technologies train perception, establishing associations between sensory 
experience and feelings, ideas and actions, expands Elizabeth Stephens.38 Likewise, Paro 
produces historically specific perceptual and affective experience. Its call on the sensations of 
touch and proprioception is not a call on universal bodily qualities, but on specific culturally 
embedded perceptual regimes.
As a historically embedded sensory technology, social robots are continuous with a range 
of sensorily dense technologies with which people interact, such as films, virtual reality 
and games, to name some products of what David Howes terms ‘hyperaethestic’ culture.39 
Interactive and gesture-driven features distinguish Paro from cinema, but place it in continuity 
with gaming technologies such as Wii and Kinect that similarly employ mechanical 
entrainment through kinaesthetic and proprioceptive senses in addition to vision and 
hearing. Devices such as an Xbox One controller go beyond employing direct touch simply 
to communicate data (like a touchscreen does) in their stimulation of the tactile imagination 
through vibration. Engaging, quantifying and provoking affect is crucial to such entertainment 
devices (that may also be used for therapeutic purposes) as well as machines like the Smile-O-
Meter, which measures an individual’s smile so that she or he can adjust it to accord with the 
standards of Japanese workplaces.
The reversibility of perception: incorporating the machinic
Paro is an interactive technology that engages in perceptual processes of its own, making the 
perception of the robot reversible. According to Merleau-Ponty, the lived body’s perception 
of another body is reversible because it incorporates into its perception the experience that 
it too is perceived. Paro can be considered to be a kind of machinic lived body that can 
perceive its interlocutor by its own methods. A precedent for such a machinic lived body is 
found in Sobchack’s exploration of film as an extension of the filmmaker’s and spectator’s 
lived bodies and their processes of expression and perception. The film, she writes, ‘transcends 
the filmmaker to constitute and locate its own address, its own perceptual and expressive 
experience of being and becoming’.40 The filmmaker’s and viewer’s perceptions are mediated 
by the camera and projector, with film re-presenting the filmmaker’s perception, which is in 
turn perceived by the spectator when viewing the projected film. Like the relationship between 
35 Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present, Routledge, 
London, 1999, p. 143.
36 See for example David Howes (ed.), Empire of the Senses, Berg Publishers, Oxford and New York, 2004.
37 Among her relevant work see Vivian Sobchack, Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image 
Culture, University of California Press, 2004, p. 135–62.
38 Elizabeth Stephens, ‘Sensation Machine: Film, Phenomenology and the Training of the Senses’, 
 Continuum, vol. 26, no. 4, 2012, pp. 529–39.
39 Howes, pp. 281–303.
40 Vivian Sobchack, The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1992, p. 9.
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self and Other, the relationship between spectator and film is reversible, that is, the spectator’s 
perceptual experience is informed by an embodied awareness that she too can be perceived by 
the Other—in this case, film.
Sobchack’s analysis of the reversibility of film substantiates that a machinic lived body 
expresses and perceives in a manner not reducible to its mechanisms. She articulates the way 
people’s interaction with such a body incorporates an awareness of its distinct ‘perceptual and 
expressive existence’.41 This relationship is both embodied and hermeneutic. In these respects, 
the reversible expression and perception of film is comparable to that of social robots. Paro’s 
cameras and sensors perceive, and its sounds and gestures express, circulating meaning and 
feelings in ways not fully governed by representation and signification. This is not to deny 
important differences in the way film and social robots mediate experience. That human–robot 
expression and perception usually aim to work in real time, whereas human–film interaction 
typically does not, is just one example of their varying temporal and spatial structures. 
Nevertheless, like film, robots exercise reversible perception and expression in ways particular 
to the material and imaginary technologies of mechanical bodies.
Leaving to the side its broader ontological implications, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
reversibility goes beyond ideas of the self-sufficient subject to convey the entwinement and 
interdependency of self–other relationships.42 Although Phenomenology of Perception gives 
the impression that the relationship between bodies is one of reciprocity and an assumption 
of sameness (‘It is as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body and mine his’43), 
in Merleau-Ponty’s later work reversibility more certainly articulates an encounter with 
difference. His famous example of reversibility shows how the self ’s experience of itself 
touching depends on an embodied awareness that it too is tangible and is able to be touched.44 
This awareness that the perception of another entails discerning that the other is perceiving 
one’s self is, as Jack Reynolds writes, a ‘non-dualistic divergence between touching and being 
touched, which necessitates some form of encroachment between the two terms … [and] 
means that the world is capable of encroaching upon and altering us, just as we are capable 
of altering it’.45 With reversibility our selves are open to an Other—in Paro’s case, a machinic 
Other—that becomes enfolded into our selves and constitutes our lived body and subjectivity. 
In establishing a circulation of normative affect through mechanical entrainment, Paro and 
other social robots produce not only affects and sensations but also subjectivities, bodies and 
selves.
Paro and its interlocutors are in a relationship of ‘mutually constituting, intraactive touch’, 
to quote Haraway.46 The robot could be considered a kind of companion species, one of those 
others that people bond with and ‘coshape’. Like a horse and trainer, human and robot are 
‘cause and effect of each other movements’ in a process of ‘nonmimetic attunement’.47 Yet, as 
41 Sobchack, p. 9.
42 For a discussion of reversibility in its more substantial sense, including a discussion of how the notion 
is expressed in the Phenomenology of Perception and further developed in The Visible and the Invisible, 
see David Morris, ‘The Enigma of Reversibility and the Genesis of Sense in Merleau-Ponty’, Continental 
 Philosophy Review, vol. 43, no. 2, 2010, pp. 141–65.
43 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 214.
44 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 146–9; and Jack Reynolds, ‘Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas and the Alterity of the Other’, Symposium: The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, vol. 6, 
no. 1, 2002, p. 68.
45 Reynolds, p. 68–9.
46 Haraway, p. 6.
47 Ibid., p. 229.
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one of many heterogeneous encounters with difference, touching Paro diverges from touching 
a pet. Eleanor Sandry points out that interactions between humans and zoomorphic robots, 
such as Paro and the mechanical dog AIBO, are ‘designed to proceed in ways that are easy for 
humans to understand’ and so ‘become stereotypical versions of human–pet relations’. These 
stereotypical relations ‘do not draw attention to the otherness of animals’.48 In its human-
created animality Paro is, in Haraway’s terms, ‘a technological compound of conjoined forces’, 
a particular assemblage of machine, animal, human that produces each.49 To touch Paro is to 
connect with its cultural, technological, economic and biological contexts.
Perception and the circulation of social imaginaries in 
robotics
With powerfully expressive machinic technologies questions must be asked about what is 
being enfolded into the embodied self, questions that bring together aesthetics and ethics. 
A set of obvious but important problems relates to the cultural norms and standards being 
incorporated into the bodily imagination. With Paro, norms are present throughout the 
perceptual and expressive cycle and take many different forms: gesture, sound, image, facial 
expression, pressure, interpersonal distance and so on. With regard to gender standards, 
for example, such norms may lie in facial recognition algorithms that identify gender, in 
the expressions made once gender has been identified, and in the gendered stylising of 
robotic faces and bodies. Norms in the form of numbers and imaginary associations (which 
are not entirely unrelated) are both important here. The algorithmically driven perception 
and expression of the social robot introduces a quantification of affect into the core of the 
perceptual process. All norms and standards involved—quantified and associative—imbue the 
embodied imagination of the robot user, consolidating relationships between bodily sensations, 
ideas, feelings and so on. Critical analysis of these relationships is crucial to investigating 
whether they contribute to what Lennon has described as a ‘damaging social imaginary’, 
that is, a social imaginary that inhibits, restricts or distresses individuals when it demands a 
response.50
A number of researchers are paying close attention to how the field of robotics perpetuates 
and challenges cultural values. Lucy Suchman has examined how the humanoid robots Martz, 
Kismet, Robota and Lucy embody claims about humanness.51 The anthropologist Jennifer 
Robertson has articulated the cultural logic underlying Japanese humanoid robots, showing 
how new technologies such as robotics can consolidate conservative values.52 Selma Sabanovic 
writes of how the developers of Paro, as well as those of other robots, ‘co-construct Japanese 
culture and robotic technology through their discourses and practices’.53 Sabanovic observes 
that developers contextualise the making of Paro in terms of local handicraft traditions in 
Nanto (where the robot is manufactured), which ‘replaces handmade crafts with industrial 
48 Eleanor Sandry, Robots and Communication, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 44.
49 Haraway, p. 250.
50 Lennon, ‘Imaginary Bodies and Worlds’, pp. 116–8.
51 Suchman, pp. 199–245. For work on Lucy see Claudia Castañeda and Lucy Suchman, ‘Robot Visions’, 
Social Studies of Science, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014, pp. 315–41.
52 Jennifer Robertson, ‘Robo Sapiens Japanicus: Humanoid Robots and the Posthuman Family’, Critical 
Asian Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, 2007, p. 371. 
53 Selma Šabanović, ‘Inventing Japan’s “Robotics Culture”: The Repeated Assembly of Science, Techno-
logy, and Culture in Social Robotics’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014, p. 345. 
Perception, Imagination and Affect in Human–Robot Relationships
Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, September 2016  13
production and transfers local consumption practices to a global market’.54 Certainly 
research has shown that there are cross-cultural differences in how Paro is received.55 Careful 
examination of the perception and expression of robots and their interlocutors, in particular 
the entwinement of affect and perception in embodied imaginative processes, is a vital addition 
to these current understandings of the ways social robots circulate cultural values.
The above considerations are especially relevant to critical analysis of robotics as a site for 
the production of social identities, and certainly research on gender and robotics suggests 
that entrenched social imaginaries are often reproduced. I focus on gender here because it is 
a topic on which research has been conducted, but one could equally focus on other aspects 
of identity. Robertson’s discussion of robosexism in Japan concludes that ‘humanoid robot 
bodies are effectively used as platforms for reducing the relationship between bodies and 
gender from a contingent relationship to a fixed and necessary one’.56 Illustrating how cultural 
norms become embodied in robots, Robertson notes that the face of Ishiguro’s gendered robots 
Actroid Repliee Q2 is a composite of the average Japanese female face, while the HRP-4C 
has a body based on the average dimensions of young Japanese females as recorded in the 
Japanese body database.57 More recently, Francesca Ferrando’s interviews with undergraduate 
and graduate cybernetics students show that AI and robotics in the United States, although 
harbouring a potential to divest gender from biology, are ‘developing under a predominantly 
male imagination’.58
Most research relating to gender and robotics investigates how robot gender impacts on 
the human user, and how gender stereotypes projected by people interacting with robots 
can encourage acceptance of humanoid social robots.59 Notably, some robotics researchers 
conclude or even assume that there are instances when it is acceptable to exploit stereotypes 
for a positive function, for instance, an elderly person might find a stereotypically gendered 
robotic behaviour more acceptable and so be more accepting of a therapeutic intervention.60 
The capacity of such an approach to perpetuate damaging social imaginaries in a circular 
fashion is substantial, given the potential for empirical research to show that the use of 
dominant and normative gender associations and standards leads to acceptance, thus extending 
their dominance. As Suchman writes, ‘the fear … is that the discourses and imaginaries that 
inspire them will retrench received opinions rather than challenge and hold open the space 
of possibilities’.61 Investigating processes of direct expression holds open such possibilities. 
54 Ibid., p. 360. 
55 Takanori Shibata et al., ‘Cross-cultural Studies on Subjective Evaluation of a Seal Robot’, Advanced 
Robotics, vol. 23, no. 4, 2009, pp. 453–8.
56 Jennifer Robertson, ‘Gendering Humanoid Robots: Robo-Sexism in Japan’, Body and Society, vol. 16, 
no. 1, 2010, p. 6.
57 Robertson, ‘Gendering Humanoid Robots’, pp. 23–4.
58 Francesca Ferrando, ‘Is the Post-Human a Post-Woman? Cyborgs, Robots, Artificial Intelligence and 
the Futures of Gender: A Case Study’, European Journal of Futures Research, vol. 2, no. 1, 2014, p. 15.
59 Julie Carpenter et al., ‘Gender Representation and Humanoid Robots Designed for Domestic Use’, 
International Journal of Social Robotics, vol. 1, no. 3, 2009, pp. 261–5; Yvette Pearson and Jason 
 Borenstein, ‘Creating “Companions” for Children: The Ethics of Designing Esthetic Features for Robots’, 
AI & Society, vol. 29, no. 1, 2014, pp. 28–30 and Benedict Tay et al., ‘When Stereotypes Meet Robots: 
The Double-edge Sword of Robot Gender and Personality in Human–Robot Interaction’, Computers 
in  Human Behavior, vol. 38, 2014, pp. 75–84. 
60 Friederike Eyssel and Frank Hegel, ‘(S)He’s Got the Look: Gender Stereotyping of Robots’, Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology, vol. 42, no. 9, 2012, pp. 2213–30 and Siegel et al., ‘Persuasive Robotics: The In-
fluence of Robot Gender on Human Behavior’, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligent 
Robots and Systems, IEEE, St Louis, 2009.
61 Lucy Suchman, ‘Subject Objects’, Feminist Theory, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, p. 130.
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It extends the understanding of how problematic entrenched imaginaries are engaged by 
robots and how they might be sidestepped and reimagined. A conservative approach is not 
inevitable or necessarily pragmatic, and research should also explore the potential for robots 
to challenge stereotypes.62 For example, Sandry’s work on the place of otherness in human–
robot collaboration recommends allowing a robot ‘to be considered familiar enough in its 
behaviour to interpret its movements as meaningful while also leaving space to acknowledge 
its fundamental differences from both humans and animals’.63
Importantly, of concern are not only those norms and standards that explicitly represent 
the humanoid body, but also the norms and standards of direct perception and expression, 
insofar as we have seen that the non-anthropomorphic Paro’s expressive features draw on 
an embodied social imaginary. The direct perception of affect accounts for the way robotic 
designs pursuing strategies other than anthropomorphism, such as zoomorphism or abstracted 
designs, are emotionally effective. With this it needs to be recognised that zoomorphic and 
seemingly abstract designs are not free of cultural norms and standards of intersubjectivity. 
Although designing non-anthropoid robots might sidestep some of the ethical, social and 
practical problems associated with anthropoid robots, the shift does not completely avoid such 
difficulties.64 If, as Alač writes, ‘getting into “the body of the machine” fashions the human 
body in terms of the machine’, then this extends to non-humanoid robots.65 Robots like Paro 
rely on intersubjective norms and standards articulated in terms of reciprocity to the human 
body, and always incorporated into the human bodies with which the robot interacts. Robots, 
of course, do not need to be designed to be reciprocal to humans. It is possible to develop 
robots in ways that cultivate their alterity, especially in terms of their distinctive sensors and 
perceptual processes. Kathrine Hayles notes the development of sensors that ‘can adapt and 
evolve independently of the epistemic categories of the humans who create them’, and Claudia 
Casteñada points out the feminist potential of conceiving of robotic bodies as a kind of 
perceiving skin that exceeds the morphology of the human.66
Demanding expression and decontextualised feeling
Paro’s employment of the embodied imagination illustrates the capacity of the expressiveness 
of social robots to regulate and intervene in our imagination. In a normative fashion or 
otherwise, such influence can potentially disrupt or overly control the self ’s associations. 
Social robots do not have to unduly control the imagination, and this is certainly desirable 
for some purposes—for example, for children’s toys or caregivers.67 Robotic artworks have 
communication as a primary function and are a form of social robot that shows robots’ 
potential to engage in open-ended and creative interaction. In contrast to Paro’s aim to 
prudently circulate a comfortable, positive affect, a robotic work of art such as Louis Phillipe 
Demer’s Blind Robot aims to provoke potentially uneasy questioning in its interlocutor about 
62 Pearson and Borenstein, pp. 23–31.
63 Eleanor Sandry, ‘Revaluating the Form and Communication of Social Robots’, International Journal of 
Social Robotics, no. 7, 2015, p. 344.
64 Suchman, pp. 119–45; Pearson and Borenstein, p. 244.
65 Alač, p. 496.
66 Hayles, p. 140; Claudia Casteñada, ‘The Future of Touch’, in S. Ahmed and J. Stacey (eds), Thinking 
through the Skin, Routledge, 2003, p. 233–4.
67 For example, children’s caregivers need to facilitate a child’s cognitive, physical and social develop-
ment. Borenstein and Pearson further point out that ‘care is not the same for each person or at each life 
stage’, p. 255.
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interaction and feeling between robots and humans. Its direct and open expression—using 
two robotic hands to feel the face of its audience before translating this information into a 
portrait—provokes unanticipated thoughts, feelings and responses in its audience such that 
they must synthesise their own meanings (as one would hope a work of art does).68
The greater persuasive power of physically present robots compared to animated or 
imagined figures is evident in research into differences between physically embodied, virtually 
embodied and virtual agents.69 As homes are filled with expressive robots to support people’s 
dieting, remind them to take their medication and inform them of the weather, it is possible 
that their affective demands sit uneasily in the context of people’s everyday lives and serve 
questionable ends. In the case of Paro, the purpose of the device in its therapeutic form is to 
encourage positive affect in patients with dementia, and the employment of the imagination 
in a normative and restricted fashion—so as to provoke minimal unexpected reactions—is 
appropriate to this task. In this instance, the generation of positive feelings generated via the 
tactile imagination is part of a therapeutic process central to improving the patients’ everyday 
lives. But feelings elicited by robots are not always so carefully or altruistically situated within 
the structure of people’s lives.
Merleau-Ponty’s account of expression and feeling suggests why casual, decontextualised 
provocation of strong feelings may be problematic. He views all feeling as genuine, writing: 
‘Illusory or imaginary emotions [so-called] are genuinely experienced, so to speak, on the outer 
fringes of ourselves.’70 What might be described by some as a false emotion is for Merleau-
Ponty an emotion that is insufficiently embedded in a person’s being or in the broader structure 
and behaviour of her life. This suggests, for example, that the issue encountered when children 
bond with and fret over robotic toys, as described by Turkle, is not that they are experiencing 
illusory feelings, but that the robotic toy cultivates overly consuming feelings about a relatively 
trivial toy, feelings that are powerful but inadequately embedded in a meaningful structure 
of a child’s life.71 Conceived this way, concerns about the capacity of social robots to provoke 
strong, caring feelings relate to their ability to place trivial, undesirable or oppressive concerns 
persistently at the centre of the self in an intrusive, controlling or cluttering way that disrupts 
processes by which the embodied self generates meaning. This goes not only for negative affects 
but also positive ones. As Sara Ahmed has convincingly shown, simply because an affect is 
positive does not mean it should be embraced, because affects are part of broader cultural-
political economies and need to be investigated for the roles they play there.72
Drawing on the example of the therapeutic robot Paro, this article began by showing how 
feelings are provoked by processes of perception and expression occurring in human–robot 
interactions. It then considered the way these processes are driven by an embodied and 
social imagination, and the implications of the reversibility of the perception of social robots. 
While the human incorporation of machines is often conceived in terms of mechanical 
elements being actually implanted in human flesh, here we see how post-human corporeality 
incorporates the machinic via the embodied imagination. Interaction with Paro is about 
68 The Blind Robot, http://www.processing–plant.com/web_csi/index.html#project=blind
69 Jamy Li, ‘The Benefit of Being Physically Present: A Survey of Experimental Works Comparing 
 Copresent Robots, Telepresent Robots and Virtual Agents’, International Journal of Human–Computer 
Studies, vol. 77, 2015, pp. 27–37. 
70 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 443.
71 Turkle, pp. 23–147.
72 Sarah Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness, Duke University Press, Durham, 2010, p. 2.
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‘experiencing the structure and mechanics in one’s own body’.73 Continuous with expressive 
practices and objects to which we are more accustomed, such as films and videogames, the 
sensations, emotions and feelings promoted by robotic interactions are embedded in culturally 
and historically specific bodily practices. As producers and products of these practices, social 
robots require scrutiny for the embodied imaginaries they employ to engage feeling, and the 
bodies and selves they produce.
About the author
Erika Kerruish is a lecturer in the School of Arts and Social Sciences at Southern Cross 
University.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Griffith University’s Social Robotics and Assistive Technology 
Laboratory for providing me with access to Paro.
Bibliography
Ahmed, S., The Promise of Happiness, Duke University Press, Durham, 2010. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1215/9780822392781
Alač, M., ‘Moving Android: On Social Robots and Body-in-Interaction’, Social Studies of Science, 
vol. 39, no. 4, 2009, pp. 491–528. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.robot.2010.07.002.20
Argall, B. D. and A. G. Billard, ‘A Survey of Tactile Human–Robot Interactions’, Robotics and Autonomous 
Systems, vol. 58, no. 10, 2010, pp. 1159–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.robot.2010.07.002.20
Blind Robot, The, http://www.processing-plant.com/web_csi/index.html#project=blind
Breazeal, C., A. Brooks, J. Gray, M. Hancher, J. McBean, D. Stiehl and J. Strickon, ‘Interactive 
Robot Theatre’, Communications of the ACM, vol. 46, no. 7, 2003, pp. 76–85. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1145/792704.792733
Carpenter, J., J. Davis, N. Erwin-Stewart, T. Lee, J. Bransford and N. Vye, ‘Gender Representation and 
Humanoid Robots Designed for Domestic Use’, International Journal of Social Robotics, vol. 1, no. 3, 2009, 
pp. 261–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12369-009-0016-4
Casteñada, C., ‘The Future of Touch’, in Thinking Through the Skin, ed. S. Ahmed and J. Stacey, Routledge, 
London, 2003, pp. 223–36.
Castañeda, C. and L. Suchman, ‘Robot Visions’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014, pp. 315–41. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0306312713511868
Chang, W. L., S. Šabanović and L. Huber, ‘Use of Seal-like Robot PARO in Sensory Group Therapy for 
Older Adults with Dementia’, Proceedings of Human Robot Interaction Conference 2013, Late-Breaking 
Reports, Tokyo Japan, 2013, pp. 101–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/HRI.2013.6483521
Coeckelbergh, M., ‘Humans, Animals, and Robots: A Phenomenological Approach to Human-
Robot Relations’, International Journal of Social Robotics, vol. 3, no. 2, 2011, pp. 197–204. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s12369-010-0075-6
Dror, O. E., ‘Counting the Affects: Discoursing in Numbers’, Social Research, vol. 68, no. 2, 2001,pp. 357–78.
73 Alač, p. 522.
Perception, Imagination and Affect in Human–Robot Relationships
Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, September 2016  17
Eyssel, F. and F. Hegel, ‘(S)He’s Got the Look: Gender Stereotyping of Robots’, Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, vol. 42, no. 9, 2012, pp. 2213–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2012.00937.x
Ferrando, F., ‘Is the Post-Human a Post-Woman? Cyborgs, Robots, Artificial Intelligence and the 
Futures of Gender: A Case Study’, European Journal of Futures Research, vol. 2, no. 1, 2014, pp. 1–17. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40309-014-0043-8
Gatens, M. and G. Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present, Routledge, London, 1999.
Gray, J., G. Hoffman, S. O. Adalgeirsson, M. Berlin and C. Breazeal, ‘Expressive, Interactive Robots: 
Tools, Techniques, and Insights Based on Collaborations’, HRI 2010 Workshop: What do Collaborations 
with the Arts have to say about HRI, 5th ACM/IEEE International Conference on HRI, Osaka, 2010, pp. 
21–8.
Haraway, D., When Species Meet, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2007.
Hayles, K., ‘Computing the Human’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 22, no. 1, 2005, pp. 131–51. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276405048438
Heerinket, J. Albo-Canals, M. Valenti-Soler and P. Martinez-Martin, ‘A Kind of Snoezelen—
Requirements for a Therapeutic Robot for Older Adults with Dementia According to Caregivers’, 
RO-MAN, 2013 IEEE, Gyeongju, 2013, pp. 680–4.
Howes, D., Empire of the Senses, Berg Publishers, Oxford and New York, 2005.
Ihde, D., Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1990.
Irigaray, L., An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. C. Burke and G.C. Gill, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York, 1993.
Kidd, C. D., W. Taggart and S. Turkle, ‘A Sociable Robot to Encourage Social Interaction among the 
Elderly’, in Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, IEEE, 
Orlando, 2006, pp. 3972–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ROBOT.2006.1642311
Klein, B., L. Gaedt and G. Cook, ‘Emotional Robots: Principles and Experiences with Paro in Denmark, 
Germany, and the UK’, GeroPsych, vol. 26, no. 2, 2013, pp. 88–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1024/1662-9647/
a000085.
Lennon, K., ‘Imagination and the Expression of Emotion’, Ratio, vol. 24, no. 3, 2011, pp. 282–98. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00500.x
Lennon, K., ‘Imaginary Bodies and Worlds’, Inquiry, vol. 47, no. 2, 2004, pp. 107–22. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/00201740410005132
Levinas, E., Totality and Infinity, trans. A. Lingis, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, 1969.
Li, J., ‘The Benefit of Being Physically Present: A Survey of Experimental Works Comparing Copresent 
Robots, Telepresent Robots and Virtual Agents’, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 
77, 2015, pp. 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2015.01.001
Massumi, B., Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Duke University Press, Durham, 2002. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/9780822383574
Merleau-Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingus, Northwestern University Press, 
Evanston, Ill., 1968.
Merleau-Ponty, M., Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 
1962.
Kerruish
Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, September 2016  18
Moran, R., ‘The Expression of Feeling in Imagination’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 103, no. 1, 2004, pp. 
75–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185873
Morris, D., ‘The Enigma of Reversibility and the Genesis of Sense in Merleau-Ponty’, Continental 
Philosophy Review, vol. 43, no. 2, 2010, pp. 141–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11007-010-9144-7
Moyle, W., E. Beattie, B. Draper, D. Shum, L. Thalib, C. Jones, S. O’Dwyer and C. Mervin, ‘Effect of an 
Interactive Therapeutic Robotic Animal on Engagement, Mood States, Agitation and Psychotropic Drug 
Use in People with Dementia: A Cluster-randomised Controlled Trial Protocol’, BMJ Open, no. 5, 2015, 
pp. 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2015-009097
Moyle, W., M. Cooke, E. Beattie, C. Jones, B. Klein, G. Cook and C. Gray, ‘Exploring the Effect of 
Companion Robots on Emotional Expression in Older Adults with Dementia: A Pilot Randomized 
Controlled Trial’, Journal of Gerontological Nursing, vol. 39, no. 5, 2013, pp. 46–53. http://dx.doi.
org/10.3928/00989134-20130313-03
Moyle, W., C. Jones, M. Cooke, S. O’Dwyer, B. Sung and S. Drummond, ‘Social Robots Helping 
People with Dementia: Assessing Efficacy of Social Robots in the Nursing Home Environment’, The 
6th International Conference on Human System Interaction, 2013, pp. 608–13, 6–8 June 2013, pp. 608–13. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/HSI.2013.6577887
Ngai, S., ‘The Cuteness of the Avant‐Garde’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 31, no. 4, 2005, pp. 811–47. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/444516
Paterson, M., The Senses of Touch: Haptics, Affects and Technologies, Berg, Oxford and New York, 2007.
Pearson, Y. and J. Borenstein, ‘Creating “Companions” for Children: The Ethics of Designing Esthetic Features 
for Robots’, AI & Society, vol. 29, no. 1, 2014, pp. 23–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11948-011-9309-8
Reynolds, J., ‘Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and the Alterity of the Other’, Symposium: The Canadian Journal of 
Continental Philosophy, vol. 6, no. 1, 2002, pp. 63–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium2002616
Robertson, J., ‘Robo Sapiens Japanicus: Humanoid Robots and the Posthuman Family’, Critical Asian 
Studies, vol. 39, no. 3, 2007, pp. 369–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672710701527378
Robertson, J., ‘Gendering Humanoid Robots: Robo-Sexism in Japan’, Body & Society, vol. 16, no. 1, 
2010, pp. 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034X10364767
Šabanović, S., ‘Inventing Japan’s “Robotics Culture”: The Repeated Assembly of Science, Technology, 
and Culture in Social Robotics’, Social Studies of Science, vol. 44, no. 3, 2014, pp. 342–67. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0306312713509704
Šabanović, S., C. Bennett, W. L. Chang and L. Huber, ‘Paro Robot Affects Diverse Interaction 
Modalities in Group Sensory Therapy for Older Adults with Dementia’, Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Rehabilitation Robotics 2013, Seattle, 2013, pp. 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/
ICORR.2013.6650427
Sandry, E. ‘Revaluating the Form and Communication of Social Robots’, International Journal of Social 
Robotics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2015, pp. 335–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12369-014-0278-3
Sandry, E., Robots and Communication, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2015. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1057/9781137468376
Scherer, D., ‘Movie Magic Makes Better Social Robots: The Overlap of Special Effects and Character 
Robot Engineering’, Journal of Human-Robot Interaction, vol. 3, no. 1, 2014, pp. 123–41. http://dx.doi.
org/10.5898/JHRI.3.1
Perception, Imagination and Affect in Human–Robot Relationships
Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, September 2016  19
Scheutz, M., ‘The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds between Humans and Social 
Robots’, in Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, ed. P. Lin, K. Abney and G. A. 
Bekey, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011, pp. 205–22.
Shibata, T., K. Wada, Y. Ikeda and S. Šabanović, ‘Cross-cultural Studies on Subjective 
Evaluation of a Seal Robot’, Advanced Robotics, vol. 23, no. 4, 2009, pp. 443–58. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1163/156855309X408826
Shinkle, E., ‘Video Games, Emotion and the Six Senses’, Media, Culture & Society, vol. 30, no. 6, 2008, 
pp. 907–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0163443708096810
Siegel, M., C. Breazeal and M. I. Norton, ‘Persuasive Robotics: The Influence of Robot Gender on 
Human Behavior’, in Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems, IEEE, St 
Louis, 2009, pp. 2563–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/IROS.2009.5354116
Sobchack, V., The Address of the Eye: A Phenomenology of Film Experience, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1992.
Sobchack, V., Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 2004.
Stacey, J. and L. Suchman, ‘Animation and Automation: The Liveliness and Labours of Bodies and 
Machines’, Body & Society, vol. 18, no. 1, 2012, pp. 1–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1357034X11431845
Stephens, E., ‘Sensation Machine: Film, Phenomenology and the Training of the Senses’, Continuum, 
vol. 26, no. 4, 2012, pp. 529–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10304312.2012.698033
Suchman, L., ‘Subject Objects’, Feminist Theory, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, pp. 119–45. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/1464700111404205
Takayanagi, K., T. Kirita and T. Shibata ‘Comparison of Verbal and Emotional Responses of Elderly 
People with Mild/Moderate Dementia and Those with Severe Dementia in Responses to Seal 
Robot, PARO’, Frontiers in Aging Neuroscience, vol. 6, 2014, pp. 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/
fnagi.2014.00257
Tay, B., T. Park, Y. Jung, Y. W. Tan and A. H. Y. Wong, ‘When Stereotypes Meet Robots: The Double-
Edge Sword of Robot Gender and Personality in Human–Robot Interaction’, Computers in Human 
Behavior, vol. 38, 2014, pp. 75–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2014.05.014
Turkle, S., Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, Basic Books, 
New York, 2011.
Wada, K. and T. Shibata, ‘Living with Seal Robots: Its Sociopsychological and Physiological Influences 
on the Elderly at a Care House’, IEEE Transactions on Robotics, vol. 23, no. 5, 2007, pp. 972–80. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TRO.2007.906261
Yu, R., E. Hui, J. Lee, D. Poon, A. Ng, K. Sit, K. Ip, F. Yeung, M. Wong, T. Shibata and J. Woo, ‘Use of a 
Therapeutic, Socially Assistive Pet Robot (PARO) in Improving Mood and Stimulating Social Interaction 
and Communication for People With Dementia: Study Protocol for a Randomized Controlled Trial’, 
JMIR Research Protocols, vol. 4, no. 2, 2015, e45. http://dx.doi.org/10.2196/resprot.4189
Kerruish
Cultural Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 2, September 2016  20
